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Court reform:
a view from the bottom
Local limited jurisdiction courts, "the lowest of the lower courts,"
have long been the focus of criticism. Reformers, however, must
carefully identify and address these courts'particular problems
and needs, because the standard court reform model may not apply.
by Julia Lamber and Mary Lee LuskinJOE VAN SEVEREN
M uch, perhaps too much,
~has been written about
lower court reform.' Al-
though most of the lit-
erature is prescriptive, scholars also
have looked at the origins and history
of court reform, identifying three peri-
ods of activism in this century.2 The
first, beginning in 1906 with Pound's
catalyzing address to the American Bar
Association, saw the formulation of
the central tenets of mainstream re-
form in calls for simplifying court
structure, centralizing accountability
Prepared under a grant from the Indiana Su-
preme Court. Points of view or opinions in this
article are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily represent those of the Indiana Supreme
Court.
1. Task Force on the Administration of Justice,
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: THE COURTS (1976); The American Bar Asso-
ciation Commission on Standards of Jtdicial Ad-
ministration, STANDARDS REI.ATING TO COURT
ORGANIZATION (1974); Silberman, NON-ATORNEY
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
(1979); Wheeler and Whitcomb,JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION (1977).
2. Munger, Movements for Court Reform: A Prelimi-
nary Interpretation, in Dubois (ed.), THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL REFORM 51 (1982). See also Glick, The Poli-
tics of State Court Reform, in Dubois, id. at 17;
Provine, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NON-LAWw:R JUDGES
AND THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (1986);
Berkson, A Brief History of Court Reform, in Berkson,
Hays, and Carbon (eds.), MANAGING "THE STATE
COURTS (1977); Baar, The Scope and Limits of Court
within the judiciary, and increasing
the professional qualifications of court
personnel. Under the banner of court
unification, these proposals became
the manifesto of mainstream reform.
A second wave of activism, in the
late 1930s and 1940s, saw the first
adoptions of these prescriptions. And
a third wave, peaking in the 1960s and
1970s, brought widespread adoption.
By the mid-1980s, Henderson and his
colleagues4 could write that the ques-
tion was not whether a state court sys-
tem was unified but the extent of unifi-
Reform, 5 JUST. Ss. J. 274 (1980); Baar, Inter-court
Relations in Comparative Perspective: Toward an Ecol-
ogy of Trial Courts, 12 JUST. Sys. J. 19 (1987);
Harrington, Delegalization Reform Movements: A His-
torical Analysis, in Abel (ed.), THE PoLITICs OF IN-
FORMALJUSTICE, VoL. 2 (1982).
3. On the elements of mainstream reform, see
Baar, Inter-Court Relations, supra n. 2, at 274-275;
Glick, supra n. 2, at 18-19.
4. Henderson, Kerwin, Guynes, Baar, Miller,
Saizow, and Greiser, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDICIAL
STRUCTURE: THE EFFECT OF UNIFICATION ON TRIAL
COURT OPERATIONS 8 (1984).
5. Baar, Inter-Court Relations, supra n. 2, at 24.
6. Baar, The Scope and Limits of Court Reform,
supra n. 2, at 283-285; Gallas, The Conventional Wis-
dom of State Court Administration: A Critical Assess-
ment and an Alternative Approach, 2 Jus. Ss. J. 35
(1976).
7. Baar, Inter-Court Relations, supra n. 2, at 23,
suggests that reform does not reach these lower
courts because they are limited jurisdiction courts
in which judges need not be lawyers.
8. Provine, supra n. 2.
cation. And Baar concluded that unifi-
cation has been accomplished and is
unlikely to proceed further.' In this
period, courts also became increas-
ingly professionalized.
Yet we should not too quickly con-
clude that court reform is complete.
First, the challenges to the underlying
principles of mainstream reform re-
main.' Second, many "unreformed"
courts continue to exist, especially
among the lowest of the lower
courts-that is, local limited jurisdic-
tion courts in which judges need not
be lawyers. Here, and among limited
jurisdiction courts more generally, re-
form has been less thorough than
among major trial courts. Baar argues
that reformers were less successful
with limited jurisdiction courts be-
cause the nature of their work made it
difficult to integrate them into a uni-
fied court structure.7 But the failure to
"reform" these courts has not meant
satisfaction with them, nor has it pro-
vided a redefinition of the ideal. In-
stead, overlapping jurisdictions, local
accountability, and nonlawyer judges
keep these courts vulnerable to the
standard reform critique.8
Opposing these pressures is the re-
295
surgent political strength of concepts
of community, access, and local au-
tonomy, manifested in the growth of
alternative dispute resolution and
community policing. These forces may
help insulate local limited jurisdiction
courts or even lead to their expansion.
Witness the proposal to use New York's
town and village courts as a model for
new community-based courts in Man-
hattan, for example.' How the main-
stream reform critique will affect the
implementation of such proposals is
unclear, but to the degree that new in-
stitutions resemble their prototypes,
they will be subject to the standard cri-
tique and prescriptions. Thus we
should expect conflict over structure,
jurisdiction, and staffing.
Whether local limited jurisdiction
courts are reformed, remain as de-
spised anomalies, or expand, it is im-
portant to understand mainstream
reform's implications for them. This
article looks at the likely impact of
standard reform prescriptions for the
local limited jurisdiction courts of one
state, Indiana. We argue that most pre-
scriptions are merely symbolic: to the
extent that the problems reformers
identify are real, mainstream reform
proposals are unlikely to address
them. Instead, reform proposals ad-
dress non-issues, advocating what are
already structural and jurisdictional
realities."l In other instances, they may
do more harm than good. For sugges-
tions for improving these courts, we
listened instead to the judges serving
in local limited jurisdiction courts,
and we propose some measures based
on their views.
Empirical study
In recently completed cross-sectional
research, we studied the work, fi-
nances, and personnel of Indiana's
city and town courts. In the fall of
1988, we mailed questionnaires to all
city and town court judges, inter-
viewed a subset of them, and collected
statistical information from a variety of
sources on caseloads, court revenues
and expenses, and city and town fi-
nances. Elsewhere we report on the
personnel, caseloads, and finances of
these courts.' Here we consider the
judges' responses to questions about
training and other support. In taking
Existing evidence
does not show that
lawyers and
nonlawyers differ
in how they judge.
the judges' views seriously, we depart
from much of the prescriptive litera-
ture, which sees the judges as venal
and ignorant at worst and well mean-
ing but incompetent at best."
Indiana cities and towns have au-
thority to create or abolish these
courts independently. In 1988, 73
communities opted for such courts,
but the majority of Indiana's cities and
towns did not. Judges for these courts
need not be lawyers and, in 1988,
more than half were not. These courts,
like similar ones in other states, have
jurisdiction over all violations of city
and town ordinances as well as over all
misdemeanors and infractions.ia City,
but not town, courts also have jurisdic-
tion in civil cases where the contested
amount does not exceed, in most
courts, $500."4 Fines for violations of
infractions and misdemeanors go to
the state. Court costs, set by state stat-
ute, are apportioned among the state,
county, and local governmental unit,
with the largest share going to the
state. As part of Indiana's general
9. N. Y. TIMEs, September 27, 1990, at B1.
10. See also Kress and Stanley, JusTicE COURTS IN
THE. STATE OF Ntw YORK 12 (1976).
11. Laimber & Luskin, City and Town Court: Map-
ping Their Dimensions, 67 IND. L.J. 59 (1991).
12. For a discussion of the empirical base of this
critique, see Provine, supra n. 2, at 45.
13. IC 33-10.1-2-2 (city coturt); 33-10.1-2-7 (town
courts). Infractions are violations of a statute for
which a person might be fined but not impris-
oned. IC 33-1-13-1 (1988). In 1981 the state legis-
lature added many infractions by decriminalizing
many traffic offenses, designating several other
actions as infractions, and lowering the status of
some existing non-traffic offenses. Acts of 1981, P.
L. 108. Maximum fines for infractions are found
in IC 43-4-32-4. Indiana created this new category
of petty violations in 1977 when it substantially re-
vised and modernized its criminal code. Acts of
court reform in the 1970s, these courts
were twice scheduled for abolition. Be-
fore their elimination, however, the
legislature enacted the current legisla-
tion allowing cities and towns courts if
they wanted them.
The critique
To the extent these courts remain
"unreformed," they continue to re-
semble justice of the peace courts be-
cause they are part-time institutions
with nonlawyer judges and very lim-
ited subject matter. And because they
look like justice of the peace courts,
criticisms of the latter stick to them.
Thus the conventional view would sug-
gest that Indiana city and town courts
exist because they are moneymakers
for their communities or cheap
sources of patronage. For example,
one reformer concludes a justice of
the peace is "prone to regard his of-
fice as a business operation rather
than a vehicle for the administration
of justice."'" The critique continues
that, because their judges need not be
legally trained, they are dependent on
police and prosecutors. Moreover, the
judges are said to be especially suscep-
tible to local economic, social, and po-
litical pressures and to personal prej-
udice, resulting in questionable
decision making. Judges of these
courts, for example, are described as
administering "unequal justice with-
out regard to law."' 6
Though consistently drawn, this pic-
ture is not based on much direct evi-
dence. 7 Our empirical study did not set
out to examine the effects of reform pro-
posals, yet we were struck by the endur-
ing quality of these courts in the face of
near universal contempt by profession-
als. Moreover, our evidence on the ac-
1977, P.L. 313, sec. 1. Probably the most common
infraction handled by these city and town courts is
speeding.
14. The subject matter is also limited so that the
ordinary city court does not have jurisdiction in
actions for slander, libel, mortgage foreclosures,
probate matters, guardians, or actions in equity.
IC 33-10.1-2-3.1.
The city courts in the three second class cities in
Lake County havejurisdiction in civil cases where
the amount in controversy does not exceed $2500.
IC 33-10.1-2-4. City courts in third class cities that
are not the county seat have civil jurisdiction
where the amount in controversy does not exceed
$1000. IC 33-10.1-2-5.
15. Vanlandingham, The Decline of the Justice of
the Peace, 12 U. KAN. L. REV. 389, 391 (1964).
16. Id.
17. Supra n. 11.
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tual work of these courts suggests why
reforms have been so unsuccessful.
Remedies
The most sweeping change, which has
been noticeably unsuccessful, would
be to eliminate these courts or, short
of that, to require their judges to be
lawyers.18 The casual observer might
argue that the latter remedy would
mean the courts' abolition. According
to this view, it is unlikely that enough
lawyers would be willing to serve. The
data, however, do not support this no-
tion. Alternatively, one might argue
that requiring the judges to be lawyers
would so alter the courts' character
that they would be no different from
other courts of limited jurisdiction.
Our guess is that the courts' character
involves more than just the judges'
educational level.
Another sweeping reform would
make these courts full time. Such a
change would address the criticisms
that the courts are not professional
and that the judges inevitably have
conflicts of interest because their main
attention is focused elsewhere. Such a
change also could alter the character
of these courts as informal, alternative
dispute forums. Because of the in-
creased costs necessary to support a
full-time court, the most likely conse-
quence of this remedy would be to
eliminate them. Even if the reform is
simply to make the judge full time, the
change probably would alter the char-
acter of the courts.
A goal of the judicial reforms of the
1970s, including the creation of In-
diana's county court system, was to cre-
ate full-time institutions and eliminate
part-time ones, yet Indiana's city and
town courts persist. In another article
we consider the ability of these courts
to withstand pressure to abolish
18. See, e.g., Task Force on the Administration
ofJustice, supra n. 1, at 35.
19. Lamber and Luskin, supra n. 11, at 79-83.
20. Silberman, supra n. 1, at 104.
21. In Indiana a second-class city has a popula-
tion range of 35,000 to 249,999. In our sample,
there are five second class cities, and all have law-
yer judges.
22. See Provine, supra n. 2. Silberman, supra n. 1,
has an extensive and useful bibliography. See also,
Kress and Stanley, supra n. 10; Ryan & Guterman,
Lawyer v. Non-Lawyer Town justices, 60 JUOICArURE
274 (1977).
23. See particularly Provine, supra n. 2, at 122-
165.
24. Silberman, supra n. 1, at 105.
them. 9 Here we discuss more limited
proposals designed to address specific
problems. These questions are related,
because how one feels about abolish-
ing the courts, restricting them to law-
yer judges, or making them full time
depends on understanding the issues
raised below.
Several reforms are pragmatic,
based on the notion that nonlawyer
judges are a necessary evil to be toler-
ated but not encouraged. For ex-
ample, Professor Linda Silberman sug-
gests that lay judges' jurisdiction
should be restricted by population, fis-
cal base, and attorney availability.20 We
heard a similar suggestion in our inter-
views, in this case, that second-class cit-
ies2' be required to have lawyer judges
or that all cities with populations over
20,000 have lawyer judges. Our data
show these suggestions already mirror
reality, even though no such limita-
tions on nonlawyer judges exist in In-
diana. All communities with a popula-
tion of more than 20,000 have lawyer
judges. Indeed, the largest Indiana
community to have a nonlawyer judge
has a population of 15,000, while the
smallest to have a lawyer judge has a
population of 2,200.
More important, this reform does
little to address the critique of these
courts; it simply assumes that lawyers
would do a better job. Existing evidence
does not show that lawyers and non-
lawyers differ in how they judge.2 2
Rather, the difference seems to be be-
tween courts with and without re-
sources.23 To the extent that court re-
sources are related to community size,
courts in smaller, rather than larger,
communities need attention. A reform
that creates two classes of courts based
on community size is likely to compound
the resource problem. The same objec-
tions hold for reforms that restrict
25. Id. at 105-110.
26. Id. at 111.
27. INDIANAJUDICIA REPORT, Vol I, 1988 at 53.
28. IC 33-10.1-5-9.
29. The Indiana City and Town Court statute
appears to allow for an automatic change of
judge, IC 33-10.1-5-2, as does a general criminal
statute, IC 35-36-5-1. Rule 12, Indiana Rules of
Criminal Procedure, however, makes the change
of judge discretionary. State ex rel. Robinson v.
Grant Superior Court No. 1, 471 N.E.2d 302, 303
(Ind. 1984) (statute has no force and effect to the
extent it conflicts with Indiana Rule of Criminal
Procedure). Accord, Gary v. State, 471 N. E. 2d
695, 698 (Ind. 1984).
nonlawyer judges to communities with
smaller fiscal bases or without lawyers.
Two other pragmatic reforms are
concerned with criminal defendants'
rights. One suggestion is that courts in
which judges need not be lawyers have
an extremely limited criminal jurisdic-
tion so that a criminal defendant's le-
gal rights are within the control of a
lawyer judge whenever possible. 4 This
limitation, the argument goes, should
be measured in terms of both com-
plexity and punishment. Thus jury tri-
als could not take place in city and
town courts because they are too com-
plicated for lay people to conduct.
Most reformers would agree that ordi-
nance and traffic violations would be
within the range of cases these courts
could hear. Silberman concludes that,
on balance, these courts also could
hear uncontested misdemeanors. But
she argues that restrictions on jurisdic-
tion should be based on possible pun-
ishments sought in a particular case
rather than the offense category. 21
The other pragmatic reform ad-
dressed to criminal defendants pro-
vides for transfer to a lawyer judge.2 6
Silberman suggests that automatic
transfer to a lawyer judge is preferred,
but providing for automatic transfer
for offenses with prison terms or re-
quiring trial de novo on appeal would
be sufficient to meet the problem.
Current practice in Indiana already
conforms to these limitations. Jury tri-
als in Indiana city and town courts are
rare: in 1988 there were seven.27 The
reported caseload is overwhelmingly
ordinance and traffic violations, and
uncontested misdemeanors. Further-
more, Indiana provides for a trial de
novo on appeal from city and town
courts.28 Indiana also allows automatic
changes in judge, by right in civil cases
and by discretion in criminal cases.29
These reforms are simply excep-
tions to the view that all judges should
be lawyers. They presuppose that
nonlawyer judges are not as good at
protecting the rights of criminal de-
fendants and that the solution is to al-
low the criminal defendant a trial by a
lawyer judge or at least to make sure
that nonlawyer judges do not decide
anything important. But to the extent
that nonlawyers and lawyers do not dif-
fer in how they judge, these exceptions
are unnecessary.
One can make similar reform argu-
ments for civil cases. Courts in which
judges need not be lawyers should
have only concurrent civil jurisdiction,
limited to "simple civil matters," with
automatic transfer to a lawyer judge
and no jury trials. Again, the data con-
form to this limitation. The statute
limits city court civil jurisdiction to
$500 in most cases, 0 although ordi-
nance violations are within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of city and town
courts. Indiana's "by right" change of
judge rule applies to civil cases, and
jury trials are very rare. But again,
there is no justification-empirical or
theoretical-for this proposal; it sim-
ply assumes that a lawyer judge would
be better.'"
Training programs
A different kind of reform calls for
mandatory training programs for
nonlawyer judges of limited jurisdic-
tion courts. Silberman reasons that
whether training is considered valu-
able depends on one's view about how
much education is needed. For those
who think that because of their com-
prehensive law school education, all
judges should be lawyers, no training
program could, or should, replace
that experience. Similarly, for those
who think that common sense is all
that is needed to preside over a court
of limited jurisdiction, training is un-
necessary, because anyone of reason-
able intelligence can serve effectively.
Silberman argues for a middle posi-
tion: Because courts of limited juris-
diction require fewer demanding legal
judgments than general jurisdiction
courts, a well-designed training pro-
gram is the best way to reduce incom-
petent decision making without elimi-
nating the position altogether.33
Any training program would have to
take into account wide differences
among the courts in workloads, re-
sources, and environment. Yearly filings
in Indiana's city and town courts ranged
from less than 100 to more than 15,000.
Notwithstanding similar jurisdictions,
the kinds of cases the courts heard dif-
fered considerably. Among city courts,
which have civil jurisdiction while town
courts do not, most heard few or no civil
cases. But the range was enormous, with
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A well-designed
training program
is the best way to
reduce incompetent
decision making.
one court's docket composed almost en-
tirely of civil cases. Criminal caseloads
varied as well. Some courts heard mostly
minor traffic violations, while others
heard mostly non-traffic misdemeanors.
A further question involves the con-
tent of a training program. The as-
sumption is that what is needed has
something to do with training in the
law, because lawyer judges are exempt.
But is training in the law the most es-
sential component? Most decisions
city and town court judges make are
not legally complex. But managing
large caseloads, mediating interper-
sonal disputes, brokering community
services, and marshaling the coopera-
tion of county-level agencies are diffi-
cult, especially with limited budgets
and nonexistent staffs. Any "well-de-
signed training program" should pay
attention to the courts' actual work.
Finally, training does little to address
the conventional critique that these
courts are interested only in making
money, providing patronage, and ig-
noring civil disputes. Nor does the re-
form address the criticism-founded
or not-that the judges are too suscep-
tible to local economic, social, and po-
30. See IC 33-10.1-2-3.1-33-10.1-2-5.
31. It is ironic that these courts are criticized on
the one hand as inadequate to decide civil cases
and on the other as inadequate for failing to hear
civil cases. It may be that the criticism for failure
to do civil work is based on the notion that a court
has to hear all kinds of cases to be a "real" court.
32. Silberman, supra n. 1, at 117; Kress and
Stanley, supra n. 10, at 159.
A different but similar reform calls for a system
of judicial counsellors; see Kress and Stanley,
supra n. 10, at 159-160; along with their suggestion
that the state assign responsibility for supervision
f 1
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litical pressure.
Another reform proposes the enact-
ment of a code of conduct for non-
lawyer judges. 4 This reform has the
potential to speak directly to some
parts of the popular critique of limited
jurisdiction courts in which judges
need not be lawyers. For example, to
the extent that the city and town
judges are criticized for relying too
much on police and prosecutor, or be-
ing too susceptible to local pressures, a
code of conduct and training in its ap-
plication may be worthwhile. Also ben-
eficial is the practice of the Indiana
Commission on Judicial Qualifications
of providing written opinions to help
resolve questions about permissible
conduct. In addition to the formal
opinions, the commission responds in
writing to judges whose concerns are
primarily local in nature.15 But neither
a code nor the opinions can address
other parts of the critique, such as the
appearance of making too much
money. The basic problem with the
code of conduct reform is the diffi-
culty of writing such a code with
enough specificity and flexibility.
The judges' views
How do the judges see their own
needs? In contrast with other studies
that rely on information from central
state sources, we sought the judges'
views of their own educational needs.
We asked judges whether they felt
their training was adequate to per-
form certain judicial functions, what
kinds of help they would find useful,
and what they find most difficult about
the job. Not surprisingly, the judges
believe they are adequately trained to
decide the cases that come before
them and to impose sentences. Eighty-
eight percent said their training is ad-
equate to decide criminal cases, 86
percent said it is adequate to decide
civil cases, and 97 percent said their
and oversight of these courts to county court
judges; id. at 153-155. Without this supervisory re-
sponsibility, which in itself is quite a drastic
change, it is unclear how this system of counsel-
lors would work.
33. Silberman, supra n. 1, at 248-49.
34. Kress and Stanley, supra n. 10, at 153. In In-
diana the state Supreme Court would enact such a
code because the Indiana Constitution grants it
exclusive and original jurisdiction in matters in-
volving the discipline, removal, and retirement of
judges in Indiana. Ind. Const. Art. 7. sec. 4.
35. INDIANAJUDICIAL RE'ORTS, 1988, Vol.1 at 1-2.
Table 1 Judges' interest in help
Help with
Civil cases
Case management
Record keeping
Personnel
Sentencing, alcohol related
Sentencing, other
Defendants' rights
Judicial ethics
Very
interested
48%
56
60
37
77
77
84
80
training is adequate to impose sen-
tences. Although both lawyers and
nonlawyers are confident, lawyers are
more confident. All the lawyers be-
lieved they have the training to per-
form all of these tasks.
Nonetheless, the judges would wel-
come help. We asked whether they
would be "very interested," "some-
what interested," or "not at all inter-
ested" in various sorts of help. Table 1
summarizes their responses. A major-
ity were at least somewhat interested in
each category of help. The judges
were least interested in help with civil
cases: 28 percent were not at all inter-
ested (no doubt because so few of
them hear civil cases). Yet even for this
item, 48 percent said they were very in-
terested in help.
Three questionnaire items per-
tained to administration: case manage-
ment, record keeping, and personnel.
Again the judges are interested in
help. Among these, they expressed the
least interest in help with personnel,
probably because most courts employ
only one person (usually part time)
besides the judge. More than three-
fourths of the judges expressed strong
interest in help with sentencing in
both alcohol-related and other cases.
They were most interested, however,
in help with respect to defendants'
rights and judicial ethics, with 84 per-
cent and 80 percent, respectively, say-
ing they were very interested.
Finally, we asked judges, "What is
the most difficult part of yourjob?" Of
the 53 judges who responded to the
question, 28 percent mentioned some
36. Baar, The Scope and Limits of Court, supra n. 2,
at 286-288.
37. Some authors are especially suspicious of
the exercise ofjudicial power in small places. See,
e.g., Wood, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLE & THEIR POLITICS
280 (1958). ("The smaller the town, the morejus-
tice is a matter of personal opinion in the commu-
nity itself, rarely formalized, rarely permanently
established depending on the sentiment of the
moment.")
Somewhat
interested
24%
40
38
51
14
17
15
18
Not at all
interested
28%
4
2
12
10
6
2
2
aspect of administration and 25 per-
cent mentioned the difficulty of im-
posing punishment. We characterized
another 36 percent of the difficulties
reported as being "other work spe-
cific"-that is, they involved perform-
ing the duties of judge. Although
these responses varied, a typical re-
sponse concerned the difficulty of
learning to be fair. Such responses are
consistent with the judges' expression
of interest in help with respect to sen-
tencing and especially with respect to
defendants' rights and judicial ethics.
Because we did not analyze case out-
comes, we cannot speak directly to the
issue of impartiality in decision mak-
ing. Nonetheless, the interviews show
judges who accept, in principle, a stan-
dard of impartiality. No doubt the
principle is easier to uphold than the
practice. Yet judges were sensitive to
special problems created by their local
ties to their communities. Some talked
about impartiality as something one
has to learn; many reported that im-
partiality was the hardest part of doing
their job. They reported feeling dis-
comfort the first few times they found
against friends or acquaintances. And
they pointed to previous experi-
ences-for example, as a law enforce-
ment officer-that prepared them to
ignore personal feelings.
A modest suggestion
Mainstream reforms are largely sym-
bolic, based on the notion that only
lawyers should be judges. To the ex-
tent the conventional critique of lim-
ited jurisdiction courts identifies prob-
lems, mainstream reform proposals
are unlikely to address them. And even
when reality conforms to suggested re-
forms, dissatisfaction remains with
limited jurisdiction courts in which
judges need not be lawyers. Yet it is
unlikely that these courts will disap-
pear in the foreseeable future (nor is it
clear that we should break out the
Dom Peringnon if they should). As
long as we retain the standard court
reform model as the sole model for
the "improvement" of these courts,
however, we inhibit action that might
provide support to them or improve
the quality ofjustice they dispense. 6
Given what is known about these
courts and their judges, states should
focus their reform efforts and educa-
tional messages on addressing ethical
dilemmas in nonthreatening contexts.
If the presumption in favor of lawyer
judges is set aside, the core of the cri-
tique of local limited jurisdiction
courts is concern about the fairness of
decision making within a structure
embedded in local politics and soci-
ety. 7 The interviews and survey sug-
gest the judges know that impartiality
in their jobs is necessary but difficult
and that there is a real interest among
the judges in knowing more.
Recent scandals in government and
business have brought issues of ethics
to the fore. Also, there is more concern
with how individuals can be sensitized
to the presence of ethical issues as they
arise in their work. Doctors, lawyers,
journalists, and researchers have real-
ized the need for training in ethics,
and ethicists are developing ways to
teach these issues. This training differs
from typical educational efforts, be-
cause the point is to practice recogniz-
ing ethical issues and to develop ways
of thinking about issues, facts, or
people, rather than to know how and
where to look something up in a book.
Not only does focusing on ethics edu-
cation reach the heart of the critique of
these courts, it has the advantage of not
involving additional costs (or generating
more paperwork) for local courts. Ef-
forts like those in Indiana to provide
written answers to local inquiries are also
good. States also might want to consider
adopting a separate code of conduct for
limitedjurisdiction courtjudges. But the
most important part of such a reform
would be training in its application or
more generally focused education on
those issues. El
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